

Model Checker Aided Design of a Controller for a Wafer Scanner

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The Uppaal Model

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Problem

ASML builds wafer scanners

- ▶ Very complex lithographic machines used in the semiconductor manufacturing process
 - ▶ Machine is regarded as Task-Resource system (flexibility)
 - ▶ Scheduling in real-time (many things can go wrong)
 - ▶ Throughput is one of the main performance characteristics
 - ▶ Deadlock should be avoided at all costs

What is this case-study about?

- ▶ Material flow in Extreme Ultra Violet (EUV) machine
 - ▶ Compute a (least restrictive) deadlock avoidance policy
 - ▶ Compute schedules (optimal wrt throughput)

Approach

AMETIST mission:


- ▶ Improve TA model checking tools
- ▶ **Investigate the applicability of TA tools**
- ▶ Link to dedicated tools when appropriate

The AMETIST approach:


- ▶ Model as dynamical system with *state space* and well-defined *dynamics*: model generates behavior (the semantics)
- ▶ Design activities (verification, synthesis) explore and modify system structure so that behavior is correct, optimal, etc
- ▶ Do not let modeling suffer from tools

Timed automaton model as mathematical carrier


Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine



Material flow in EUV machine




Material flow in EUV machine



Straightforward modeling

- ▶ Every place is modeled by a state variable which can be empty (e), red (r), or green (g)
- ▶ Every pair of arrows is modeled by an asynchronous process




```

module main ()
{
  -- the places in the machine:
  l : array 0..3 of {e,r,g};
  c : array 0..1 of {e,r,g};
  rb: array 0..1 of
    array 0..1 of {e,r,g};

  -- initialization:
  for (i=0; i<4; i=i+1)
    init(l[i]):=e;
  for (i=0; i<2; i=i+1)
    for (j=0; j<2; j=j+1)
      init(rb[i][j]):=e;
  for (i=0; i<2; i=i+1)
    init(c[i]):=e;

  -- system dynamics:
  for (i=0; i<4; i=i+1)
    t2l[i]: process entry_exit(l[i]);

  for (i=0; i<4; i=i+1)
    for (j=0; j<2; j=j+1)
      l2r[i][j]: process move(l[i],rb[(i<2?0:1)][j]);

  for (i=0; i<2; i=i+1)
    for (j=0; j<2; j=j+1)
      for (k=0; k<2; k=k+1)
        r2c[i][j][k]: process move(rb[i][j],c[k]);

  for (i=0; i<2; i=i+1)
    exp[i]: process expose(c[i]);
}

module entry_exit (p)
{
  if (p=e)
    next(p):=r;
  else if (p=g)
    next(p):=e;
}

module move (lft,rgt)
{
  if (lft=r && rgt=e)
  {
    next(lft):=e;
    next(rgt):=r;
  }
  else if (lft=e && rgt=g)
  {
    next(lft):=g;
    next(rgt):=e;
  }
}

module expose (p)
{
  if (p=r)
    next(p):=g;
}

```

Handling deadlock

3 ways of handling deadlock:

- ▶ Deadlock prevention: restrict system such that deadlock is a priori impossible
- ▶ Deadlock detection: detect and resolve deadlocks at runtime
- ▶ Deadlock avoidance: dynamically choose control actions to avoid deadlock

Deadlock avoidance: keep the system in a set of safe states (Dijkstra, 1965)

- ▶ What is deadlock and what are safe states?
- ▶ How to express deadlock and safety in CTL?
- ▶ How to characterize the set of safe states?

Informal definitions

Deadlock:





- ▶ A state is a *deadlock* iff there is a circular wait (*Operating systems – internals and design principles*, Stallings)
- ▶ In our model, a state is a deadlock iff there exists a wafer that cannot move anymore

Safety:

- ▶ A state is *safe* iff all processes (wafers in our case) can be run to completion (*Banker's algorithm*, Dijkstra, 1965).
- ▶ In our model, a wafer is run to completion when it exits the machine

CTL interlude

SMV builds a transition system over which it interprets CTL



CTL definitions

$$\mathbf{deadlock} \equiv \bigvee_{p \in P} \mathbf{AG}(p \text{ is not empty})$$

$$\mathbf{safe} \equiv \mathbf{EF} \left(\bigwedge_{p \in P} (p \text{ is empty}) \right)$$

where P is the set of places of the EUV machine

Note: $\mathbf{deadlock} \rightarrow \neg \mathbf{safe}$ but in general not: $\neg \mathbf{safe} \rightarrow \mathbf{deadlock}$

Avoiding Deadlock

What is the connection between **safe and **deadlock** states?**

- ▶ We want to show that safe states really are safe, ie, it is always possible to avoid deadlock
- ▶ Furthermore, the set of safe states is the largest set from which deadlock can always be avoided

$$s_{\text{init}} \models \mathbf{AG}(\text{safe} \iff \mathbf{EG}(\neg\text{deadlock}))$$

Least restrictive deadlock avoidance policy for EUV machine:

- ▶ Keep it within the set of safe states!

Characterizing the set of safe states

Iterative approach:

set $C = true$





while $s_{init} \not\models \mathbf{AG}(\mathbf{safe} \iff C)$ do:

Update C to exclude counterexample (involves thinking)

This case: 4 iterations to get 4 unsafe situations (mod symmetry)

Note:

- ▶ Creative step is not needed: SMV internally builds a BDD representation of the set of safe states if you ask whether $s_{init} \models \mathbf{safe}$
- ▶ However, the iterative process gives a good feeling for problems (a BDD does not)



Predicate C that exactly characterizes the set of safe states:


```

~( (l[0]=r & l[1]=r & rb[0][0]=g & rb[0][1]=g)
  | (l[2]=r & l[3]=r & rb[1][0]=g & rb[1][1]=g)
  | (~c[0]=e & ~c[1]=e & rb[0][0]=r & rb[0][1]=r & rb[1][0]=r & rb[1][1]=r)
  | (~c[0]=e & ~c[1]=e & rb[0][0]=r & rb[0][1]=r &
    ((rb[1][0]=r & rb[1][1]=g) | (rb[1][0]=g & rb[1][1]=r)) & l[2]=r & l[3]=r)
  | (~c[0]=e & ~c[1]=e & rb[1][0]=r & rb[1][1]=r &
    ((rb[0][0]=r & rb[0][1]=g) | (rb[0][0]=g & rb[0][1]=r)) & l[0]=r & l[1]=r)
  | (~c[0]=e & ~c[1]=e & ((rb[0][0]=r & rb[0][1]=g) | (rb[0][0]=g & rb[0][1]=r)) &
    ((rb[1][0]=r & rb[1][1]=g) | (rb[1][0]=g & rb[1][1]=r)) &
    l[0]=r & l[1]=r & l[2]=r & l[3]=r)
)
  
```

Refinement of the SMV model


Refinement of the SMV model

Add detail and timing




Refinement of the SMV model

Add constraints (locks for instance; also mutual exclusion)



Refinement of the SMV model

Add Observer process (for throughput optimization)




Ask Uppaal whether

$$s_{\text{init}} \models \mathbf{EG} \left(\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{Observer.L0} \implies \mathbf{Observer.x} \leq H \\ \wedge \\ \mathbf{Observer.L1} \implies \mathbf{Observer.x} \leq S \end{array} \right)$$

Relation with the SMV model:

There is a *stuttering bisimulation* R between the Uppaal model and the SMV model. Thus, CTL\X formulas are preserved (Browne, Clarke & Grumberg, 1988)



Adding heuristics


The state space is too large

- ▶ Locks can depressurize or pressurize (almost) any time
- ▶ Internal robots can turn (almost) any time
- ▶ Chuck can swap (almost) any time
- ▶ Large differences in time scale: 670 (lock depres) vs 10 (turn)


Solutions:

- ▶ Avoid unsafe material configurations
- ▶ Avoid useless transitions (turns, swaps, etc)
- ▶ Make some transitions greedy/urgent


Optimal schedule



Optimal schedule for no crossing wafer paths



Some schedule for 2 locks and 1 internal robot



- ▶ *Short* and *exact* characterization of safe states (either by iterative process or by extracting a BDD from SMV)
- ▶ Synthesis of a schedule that optimizes throughput; analysis of an alternative configuration and control policy
- ▶ We have adjusted abstraction level for different goals and proved soundness
- ▶ It took us approx. 2 weeks to build the models and to obtain our results
- ▶ Our work confirms once more that formal modeling and analysis may help to improve the design process; our work is referred to in a patent application filed by ASML
- ▶ Scalability?

